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## Imaginary Fathers: A Sentimental Perspective on the Question of Identifying Sperm Donors

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[Donor insemination] children may desire to know their biological parents. . . . But is this desire a rational one?

— Michael D. Bayles, *Reproductive Ethics*, 1984

Artificial impregnation . . . may at first shock the delicate sensibilities of the sentimental who consider that the source of the seed indicates the true father.

— A.D. Hard, *Artificial Impregnation*, 1909

The traditional secrecy surrounding donor insemination is giving way to increased openness. Gamete recipients are increasingly encouraged to tell their children about the conditions of their conception.<sup>1</sup> Less clear, however, is what follows when the child wants to know more about the donor, who in the United States usually remains anonymous. How do children conceive of biological parents they can never meet? Is rationality the best criterion for evaluating the desire of offspring to track down their donors, or do we need to look at the question in a different way? The struggle over disclosure of donors' identity may be seen as a struggle between reason and imagination, or between information and narrative.

The protagonist of Charles Dickens's fictional autobiography *Great Expectations* introduces himself to the reader by attempting a paternal genealogy. "I give Pirrip as my father's family name," Pip says, "on the authority of his tombstone."<sup>2</sup> This stone is a source of more than a name, however. He continues: "As I never saw my father or my mother . . . my first fancies regarding what they were like, were unreasonably derived from their tombstones. The shape of the letters on my father's gave me an odd idea that he was a square, stout, dark man, with curly black hair." In the absence of a living, corporeal, and visible father, Pip makes do with what concrete evidence is available: the words on the tombstone, and not their content, not the objective information they convey, but the impression of a kind of person evoked by the form and style of the letters. For Pip, "father" is the personification of the attributes of an inanimate object.

New legislation in the United Kingdom means that sperm donor anonymity is no longer an option. Children of men who donated after April 2005 will be given their genetic fathers' identifying information,

including last known address, when they turn 18.<sup>3</sup> Sweden, Austria, Switzerland, and the Netherlands have similar laws.<sup>4</sup> In the United States there are no laws governing donors' anonymity, but individual facilities enable donors to allow themselves to be identified, and recipients to choose donors their children will be able to learn about and possibly meet later on. The Sperm Bank of California, for example, gives donors the option to be part of an Identity Release Program that provides identifying information to offspring who are 18 or older.<sup>5</sup> I suggest both that the identity-release model should be standard for sperm donation, even if this reduces the number of donors, and that perhaps information should be provided to children younger than 18. The legal ramifications of this second suggestion are probably prohibitive, but the age restriction raises significant questions about the offspring's need for, and right to, access to the biological father while still a child. The problem of nomenclature that arises when discussing donor insemination (DI) is revealing. Just as we are all, no matter how old we get, always our parents' children, so the offspring of donors are particularly marked by their special condition as the children of people who are not, in many senses of the word, parents. To this extent, perhaps "childishness" should be acknowledged as a problematic part of the identity of donor offspring. Perhaps the struggle so many children of donors experience as they search for their biological fathers is about reconciling the demands of the adult world for reasonableness with children's need to imagine who made them.

In *David Copperfield*, Dickens includes an additional dimension in the protagonist's fantasy about his father: "I was a posthumous child. My father's eyes had closed upon the light of this world six months when mine opened on it. There is something strange to me, even now, in the reflection that he never saw me; and something stranger yet in the shadowy remembrance that I have of my first childish associations with his white gravestone in the churchyard, and of the indefinable compassion I used to feel for it lying out alone there in the dark night. . . ."<sup>6</sup>

David feels an emotional connection to the object that stands for his absent father. He pities the gravestone. The adult David considers this compassion "strange" and his attachment "childish." To personify this inanimate object is irrational and sentimental, he implies, as it shows the unformed ideas and uncontrolled feelings of the immature. Similarly, the adult Pip in *Great Expectations* retrospectively describes the picture of his father that was derived from the tombstone as "unreasonable." Both of Dickens's adult protagonists see their father fantasies as childish and irrational, but both Pip and David grow up, in their respective novels, formed and flawed by the absence of a knowable biological father.

For the child of traditional, anonymous DI, the biological father is, of course, not necessarily dead. He may be — but not even this much can be known. This father has been almost completely erased. Traces, however, remain. He is signified in his child's imagination not by a gravestone, but by the material technology that surrounds conception, the signs of science: a labeled straw of frozen sperm, a laboratory.

One woman conceived by DI remembers wanting to know what a test tube looked like, since she was told as a child that she was conceived the way "cows [are] 'injected' with test tubes of sperm," leading her to imagine "a picture of grunting farm animals, test tubes, sperm, and me."<sup>7</sup> The instruments associated with the procedure come to stand metonymically for the father separated from his genetic material. An obstetrician can ask, "Is there a single person among us who would not be shocked to learn that his father was a sperm bank?"<sup>8</sup> Another states rather gratefully, "I wouldn't care to owe my origins to a liquid nitrogen tank."<sup>9</sup>

This dehumanization of the sperm donor is usually, for the adult participants in the process, voluntary and deliberate. A 1951 account in the *Journal of the American Medical Association* of the psychological and social issues surrounding donor insemination focuses only on the "patient" — that is, the woman to be impregnated — and her husband. Neither donor nor offspring is mentioned. The authors warn that care must be taken in selecting patients because the procedure "involves the invasion of a woman's body for purposes of reproduction by a man not her husband, [and as such] it does overstep the bounds of the conventional social mores."<sup>10</sup> The authors reassure themselves, however, that well-chosen patients are unlikely to be offended by such irregularity: "Feminine psychology is not intrinsically antipathetic to donor insemination . . . indeed, some [patients] derive a peculiar satisfaction from the coldly scientific nature of the operation."<sup>11</sup>

It seems likely that the physician carrying out the "operation" is also reassured by its scientific coldness. Medicalizing DI allowed it to be framed as a treatment for infertility rather than as the conception of a child. This effort to elide the donor is made explicit in the following admonition, given by a DI practitioner, in 1981. He expects recipients of donor sperm to play a careful mind game with themselves: "The myth of 'blood and flesh' has to be uprooted and a state of consciousness has to be achieved in which the donor, from the psychologic point of view, does not exist. Donor semen should then be regarded as 'material' from anonymous testes, the donor actually being a 'nonperson.'" <sup>12</sup> The biological father, then, was no more than a "myth," a fantasy easily expunged from the minds of any healthy, newly expectant couple. Once DI is acknowledged, however, the blood and flesh person, both real and missing, is hard to eradicate.

The donor is frequently reduced to the act by which he is defined, an act at once clinical and embarrassing. One adult DI offspring describes the way her own children imagine their genetic grandfather: "They talk about my donor father with irreverence . . . as to them he is just some old bloke whose only known attribute is an ability to masturbate to order. . . . He is perceived as a figure of fun and ridicule rather than as a real person. . . ." <sup>13</sup> The sexual aspect of sperm donation becomes the only knowable aspect of the donor, and anonymity increases the sense of it as a shameful sexuality.

A blank screen on which fantasies can be projected, the biological father is also often idealized. Donor offspring talk in interviews about adolescent fantasies of a "real dad" who is a famous celebrity or a Nobel scientist. A picture book written to explain DI to children carefully affirms that the social father is the only "dad" a child has. "Will I ever meet the donor?" asks the first-person narrator, a little boy conceived by DI. <sup>14</sup> "Dad says probably not. It usually doesn't work that way. It would be hard to find him because we don't really know whose sperm it was. . . . I got his genes and that's an important part of who I am, but he's not my dad." The language itself reveals the difficulty of articulating this nonperson. The donor is "him," but a "him" who doesn't exist, because the only aspect of him relevant to the boy is genetic material, "sperm" and "genes" that are human but personless. The donor pronoun "he" has no precisely identifiable antecedent. At the same time, however, an illustration in the book visually represents this permanently unknowable man. The boy is shown playing ball with his mother and social father, and the donor is drawn in the air above them, a fantasy portrait. He physically resembles the child and the mother — all three are blonde, unlike the dark-haired "dad." The donor hovers above the social family like a kind of guardian angel, or the desirable apex of a mystical parental trinity. The book cannot maintain the delicate balance between acknowledging DI conception to a child and eliding the biological father as a person. The author and illustrator cannot be wholly honest in their depiction of the anonymous sperm donor, who is necessarily and permanently invisible.

Uprooting the myth of the flesh and blood donor and replacing it with an abstraction is meant to relieve the anxiety of the physician and of the recipient of the donation. But what about the human being who is the result of the procedure? Unfortunately, this dehumanization has significant implications for the child. One man conceived by DI describes the effect of this abstracting on his own sense of self: "As a person conceived through donor insemination . . . I have an additional question besides 'who' I am. How do I describe *what* I am? There are no satisfactory labels to describe people like me . . . we became 'donor offspring,' and finally products of therapeutic gamete donation.' The media have facetiously labeled us 'test-tube babies,' 'kidsicles,' or 'spermees.' All these labels have served to dehumanize us, to make our human condition even more abstract." <sup>15</sup> [Emphasis added.] Eliding the donor also emphasizes the technological creation of the child: "Doctors are like fertility gods who view us purely as abstract commodities to assist [those] who are unable to have children. They rarely look beyond the microscopic view of gametes, zygotes, blastocysts, embryos, or the ultrasonic images of fetuses, to see the human face of the people they create." <sup>16</sup> The effacement of the donor leads to offspring who feel faceless. As another says: "I felt like I was the product of some science experiment — a freak." <sup>17</sup>

M.D. Bayles, in his 1984 book, *Reproductive Ethics*, seems puzzled by those who question the value of donor anonymity. He appeals to reason — or rather he assumes that rationality is the only criterion that counts in evaluating the desire to know the genetic father: "children may desire to know their biological

parents. . . . But is this desire a rational one? Finding out who one's genetic father is means learning his personal identity. Why would that be important? The mere knowledge does not entitle one to inheritance, other financial support, or love. What one's genetic father is or was — criminal, actor, politician, industrial worker — does not, except for certain genetic traits, determine or indicate what type of person one is or is going to become."<sup>18</sup> By reducing the value of knowing one's biological father to its instrumental uses, Bayles avoids more complex existential motivations. He dismisses most interest in finding parents as "culturally conditioned (and exaggerated by the media)," but he does accept one good reason for learning more about biological paternity: "the possibility of inheriting a genetic disease. Such a concern is certainly rational, but fulfilling it does not require learning the donor's identity." He concludes that "Overall it appears that retaining records of the personal identity of donors . . . is not worth the effort."<sup>19</sup>

Providing abstract, non-identifying information about the donor, while certainly better than nothing, does not address this sense of freakishness. Just as David Copperfield and Pip imagine their dead fathers less according to the names and dates on their gravestones than according to the concrete reality of the stones themselves, and as the children's book's author cannot resist including a picture of the donor's fantasy face, so donor offspring can't help but imagine their biological fathers as something more than collections of facts.

The limitations of this view reflect a dichotomy that seems to underlie the bioethical debates about whether or not it is right to include the future disclosure of identity as a requirement of gamete donation. I want to suggest that an offspring's "irrational" need to encounter the donor as a flesh and blood person is a significant need, and should probably be a legal right. Dismissing this need because it seems irrational — or sentimental or childish — reveals a limited view of the role of genetic parenthood in the identity of offspring. Identity is not only about information; it is also, fundamentally, about *narrative*.

It is not uncommon for sons and daughters of anonymous sperm donors to describe themselves in bibliographic terms, as feeling like a book without an author, or as one missing the first chapter. Much work has been done on the narrative nature of human identity; a significant aspect of this is the place of parentage and heritage in the individual's life story. Identity is historical, extending over time beyond birth and death, part of a collective narrative rooted in heredity biology.

This fact reverberates through the great literary Rorschach of reproductive technology, Mary Shelley's *Frankenstein*, to which I returned after reading the words of one writer on a donor offspring internet group: "I am a 19 [year old] female who is searching for her father. . . . My entire life I felt like there was a piece of me missing. . . . I was 'put together' in Vancouver. . . . I believe the month was January or February. The man who donated was a medical student. . . ."<sup>20</sup>

"I was put together." She views her conception as the mechanical compilation of fragments. The "missing piece" in her identity should be a central character in her autobiography, one who partook in an irreversible founding act of creation. This sense of loss exceeds the "genealogical bewilderment" often associated with adoption.<sup>21</sup> The donor is needed not only to provide information about ancestry, but to act as evidence of humanity. In her guide to donor insemination, Elizabeth Noble provides a list of things donor offspring wonder about. It includes: "I wonder what it feels like to have been naturally created?"<sup>22</sup> This is an extraordinary concern. The 19-year-old does not imagine herself born, or conceived, just assembled by medical science.

The medicalized secrecy model produces a sense of shameful abnormality that is not at all inherent in the process of DI conception itself. This imposition of shame on the meaning of an essentially beneficent process is what causes the creature in *Frankenstein* to become monstrous. Dr. Victor Frankenstein begins his project filled with scientific idealism. By harnessing the secret of life, he will outwit disease and death. He carefully selects the best parts when putting together his creature, but then it comes to life and it looks at him. Suddenly he is filled with horror and remorse, and he disowns the creature, saying, "I was unable to endure the aspect of the being I had created."<sup>23</sup> He flees, hoping perhaps that by escaping the creature's need for him he will escape accountability for the creation itself. Frankenstein's offspring is made monstrous not by his

unconventional conception, but by the fact that his creator sees the end of his project — and of his responsibility — as the production of offspring. This is not unlike solving the problem of childlessness simply by putting together a pregnancy.

The anonymity of donors fosters the pretence that DI is a medical procedure that is performed on a single patient, the woman who becomes the mother, and that the doctor alone “cures” her childlessness. Historically, the secrecy surrounding DI was linked to the extreme informality by which donors were selected: in 1979, it was found that “62 percent of DI practitioners used medical students” as donors.<sup>24</sup> Both convenience and a eugenic sense that, as one doctor put it, “physicians and true scientists make ideal donors,” produced the dual role of medical professionals as both facilitators of the conception process, and as genetic fathers.<sup>25</sup>

One of the medical students present at the first recorded medical donor insemination, carried out by William Pancoast on an anesthetized woman (in Philadelphia in 1884), published an article in 1909 on the eugenic value of “artificial impregnation.” In it he uses an astonishing analogy to try and demonstrate that biological paternity may easily be separated from parenting: “The man who thrusts his nose into a beautiful blossom to surfeit his sense of smell on the sweet perfume, is merely breathing the lustful odor from the sexual organ of the plant; and if his nose displaces some of the pollen, he may be the father of the next flower. If the honey bee does the work, it might be called the father.”<sup>26</sup>

What this shows, as well as the author’s evident preference for the coldly scientific over that which might produce “lustful odors,” is a misattribution of biological paternity. If the flower’s father is the nose or the bee, then, by this analogy, in donor insemination, the offspring’s father is the one who transfers the “pollen” to the mother: not the donor, in other words, but the doctor. This Promethean view of physician-inseminator-creator is rationally and biologically flawed — unless we change radically our definition of the word “father” — but it reveals perhaps a not-wholly-conscious reason for medicine’s tenacious denial of long-term connections between donor and offspring. The responsibility for so many new lives had to be carefully delimited.

This same medical student himself admits, in a reply to the letters his article provoked, that “I would not wish to own a child that was bred with a hard-rubber syringe. And I do not care to think that my child bears toward the millennium no traces of his father’s personality.”<sup>27</sup>

One possible advantage of removing the option of donors’ anonymity is that different people may choose to donate gametes. In Sweden, where donors’ anonymity has not been the norm since 1985, the demographics of donors have changed. Fewer medical students donate sperm, and more older, married men have taken their place.<sup>28</sup> Even though the sperm supply would probably be reduced, at least temporarily, this change might in the long term be better for those who are conceived with the sperm of men who may recognize the extended implications of their gift.

As well as fewer donors, those who support continued anonymity fear that offspring will make unreasonable claims on their donors. In *Frankenstein*, the creature tracks down Victor Frankenstein and confronts him, saying: “You, my creator, detest and spurn me, thy creature, to whom thou art bound by ties only dissoluble by the annihilation of one of us. . . . How dare you sport thus with life? Do your duty towards me, and I will do mine towards you and the rest of mankind.”<sup>29</sup> Frankenstein, as scientist-practitioner, and as father-creator, has a duty to fulfill. Daniel Callahan, in his discussion of bioethics and fatherhood, distilled the claim on which, in his view, unavoidable paternal obligation rests: “Because of you I exist in this world.”<sup>30</sup>

The creature makes the same claim on Frankenstein’s attention. He does not want money or even affection from his creator. He wants two things. One is unique to his uniquely man-made origin: a second act of artificial reproduction, making another who is like himself, in order, he says, to “become linked to the chain of existence and events from which I am now excluded.”<sup>31</sup> He needs a community in which to embed his story. Second, and also to end his isolation, he wants his own life narrative to be acknowledged by his parent. At first, Frankenstein refuses to listen to the creature’s story. What he says seems to me, in this context, the most telling line in the whole novel: “I will not hear you,” says Dr. Frankenstein to his offspring. “There can be no community between you and me.”<sup>32</sup>

Community can mean many things. In Shelley's novel, it may be as limited as a mutual gaze of recognition and assent. For many DI offspring, it may be no more — or less — than this, too. The creature makes Frankenstein listen to him, and, on hearing his autobiography, Frankenstein begins to recognize the person he has brought to being. He admits, "For the first time . . . I felt what the duties of a creator towards his creature were."<sup>33</sup>

I do not mean to suggest that DI is monstrous unless donors effectively become social fathers to all offspring. I am arguing, however, that the child's sense of incompleteness and abnormality is directly linked to a narrative rift between progenitor and protagonist. Knowing one's genetic parentage is as much biographical as it is biological. Or, to be more precise, and admittedly more essentialist: for most people, especially those denied knowledge of a progenitor, biological identity and biographical identity cannot be separated.

On an internet website, one can buy child-size tee-shirts and bibs bearing the words, "My Daddy's name is Donor."<sup>34</sup> Parents who put these on their children are probably making a brave attempt to diminish the stigma of DI. Their ventriloquism exposes, however, the same curious generational shortsightedness that characterized the historical origins of artificial insemination by donor, when seen as a cure for adults' infertility rather than as an experimental new form of reproduction that would produce a generation of children with unprecedentedly asexual origins. Much like the Dickensian tombstones, these post-modern clothes are inscribed inanimate objects that represent unknowable people. Unlike the tombstones, they represent not the child's imaginings, but the parents', and while the clothing acknowledges as well as trivializes the place of the "Daddy's name" in the child's identity, the joke marks its unconsenting wearer with loss, rather than with defiance. While concealing DI assumes that a child can be conceived in a narrative vacuum and then slotted into a pre-existing master narrative about the "normal" nuclear family, exposing DI without providing access to the identity of the donor removes the master narrative without giving the child enough material to construct a new narrative.

Maggie Kirkman, in her study of the stories parents tell their DI offspring, states, "Parents are the narrators from whose stories their children begin to construct their own narrative identities."<sup>35</sup> She points out that the social parents of DI offspring are "in the vanguard of the challenge to normative narratives of conception," for they are required to tell brand-new family stories. In the context of these new stories, Kirkman asserts the value of offsprings' thinking of the donor as a person, even if they cannot know his identity. I want to suggest that the only real way to have a sense of the donor as a person — a particular person, rather than a fantasy — is by knowing his identity.

The medical student who was involved in the first acknowledged act of human artificial insemination by a donor ascribes an additional value to DI. He explains the eugenic value of allowing human reason to assist nature in avoiding the hereditary disadvantages of human love. "From a nature point of view the idea of artificial impregnation offers valuable advantages. The mating of human beings must, from the nature of things, be a matter of *sentiment* alone. Persons of the worst possible promise of good and healthy offspring are being lawfully united in marriage every day. . . . Artificial impregnation by carefully selected seed, alone will solve the problem [although] it may at first shock the delicate sensibilities of the sentimental."<sup>36</sup>

Perhaps the very pragmatic project of achieving conception with donor gametes — like the broader and equally pragmatic project of medicine itself — has for too long underrated the "sentimental," the emotional, the irrational. It may well, by some criteria, be unreasonable to want to know one's biological father, but, if so, this should serve less as a reason for concealing donors' identity than as a guide to rethinking the extent to which we rely on rationality alone in making policy that will govern the identity of new generations of children, who surely deserve to know the person who remains — no matter how happy and sufficient the child's social family — a particular person of immense imaginative significance. This flesh-and-blood person cannot be "uprooted," and will never be reducible simply to information.

## NOTES

A version of this article was first presented at the 2003 Montreal joint meeting of the American Society for Bioethics and Humanities and the Canadian Bioethics Society, as part of a panel on the identification of donors that was organized by Susan Rubin.

The first epigraph in this article is from M.D. Bayles, *Reproductive Ethics* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1984), 20. The second is from A.D. Hard, "Artificial Impregnation," *Medical World* 27 (April 1909): 163.

1. See, for instance, R. Rowland, "The Social and Psychological Consequences of Secrecy in Artificial Insemination by Donor (AID) Programmes," *Social Science and Medicine* 21, no. 4 (1985): 391-6; C. Lorbach, ed., *Let the Offspring Speak: Discussions on Donor Conception* (New South Wales, Australia: Donor Conception Support Group of Australia, 1997); A. Rumball and V. Adair, "Telling the Story: Parents' Scripts for Donor Offspring," *Human Reproduction* 14, no. 5 (1999): 1392-9; A.J. Turner and A. Coyle, "What Does it Mean to be a Donor Offspring?" *Human Reproduction* 15, no. 9 (2000): 2041-51; A. McWhinnie, "Gamete Donation and Anonymity," *Human Reproduction* 16, no. 5 (2001): 807-17.

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3. See UK Department of Health policy, <http://www.dh.gov.uk/PolicyAndGuidance/HealthAndSocialCareTopics/AssistedConception>.

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6. C. Dickens, *David Copperfield*, ed. G.H. Ford (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1958), 10.

7. R. Snowden and G.D. Mitchell, *The Artificial Family: A Consideration of Artificial Insemination by Donor* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1981), 88.

8. E. Noble, *Having your Baby by Donor Insemination: A Complete Resource Guide* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1987), 329.

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13. C. Lorbach, *Experiences of Donor Conception: Parents, Offspring, and Donors through the Years* (London: Jessica Kingsley Publishers, 2003), 172.

14. J.T. Schnitter, *Let Me Explain: A Story about Donor Insemination* (Indianapolis, Ind.: Perspectives Press, 1995), 25.

15. B. Cordray, "Reproductive Technologies: Emotional Adoption," 2000, <http://www.americanadoptioncongress.org/articles-archives/reproductive-tech.htm>, accessed 20 June 2005.

16. See note 13 above, p. 167.

17. A.J. Turner and A. Coyle, "What Does It Mean to be a Donor Offspring? The Identity Experiences of Adults Conceived by Donor Insemination and the Implications for Counseling and Therapy," *Human Reproduction* 15 (2000): 2043.

18. M.D. Bayles, *Reproductive Ethics* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1984), 20.

19. Ibid., 21.

20. "I am searching for my father," online posting, 3 April 2000, Yahoo! Health E-Groups: Sperm Donors, <http://groups.yahoo.com/group/SpermDonors/message/50?source=1>, accessed 13 June 2005.
21. H. Sants, "Genealogical Bewilderment in Children with Substitute Parents," *British Journal of Medical Psychology* 37 (1964): 133-41.
22. See note 8 above, p. 306.
23. M. Shelley, *Frankenstein* (Harmonds-worth, London: Penguin Books, 1985), 105.
24. M. Curie-Cohen, L. Luttrell, and S. Shapiro, "Current Practice of Artificial Insemination by Donor in the USA," *New England Journal of Medicine* 300, no. 11 (1979): 585-90, 587.
25. See George Annas's discussion of the eugenic implications of physician-selected donors in his early alert that the interests of the offspring should take precedence over concern for the donor. G.J. Annas, "Fathers Anonymous: Beyond the Best Interests of the Sperm Donor," *Family Law Quarterly* 14, no. 1 (1981): 1-13, 6.
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28. L. Beecham, "B[ritish] M[edical] A[ssociation] Annual Representative Meeting: Sperm Donors Should Be Guaranteed Anonymity," *British Medical Journal* 329 (2004): 72.
29. See note 23 above, p. 145.
30. D. Callahan, "Bioethics and Fatherhood," *Utah Law Review* 3 (1992): 735-46, 739.
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34. E. Marquardt, "Kids Need a Real Past," *Chicago Tribune* online edition, 15 May 2005, <http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/opinion/chi-0505140249may15,0,7939985.story?coll=chi-newsopinion-perspective-hed>, accessed 19 May 2005.
35. M. Kirkman, "Parents' Contributions to the Narrative Identity of Offspring of Donor-Assisted Conception," *Social Science and Medicine* 57, no. 11 (2003): 2229-42.
36. See note 26 above.